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EMPLOYERS BEWARE: THE IMPLIED
CONTRACT EXCEPTION TO THE EMPLOYMENT-
AT-WILL DOCTRINE
I. INTRoDucrloN
Nineteenth century employment law defined the framework of mutual rights and
obligations between employer and employee in terms of the traditional relationship
between master and servant' rather than by reference to the mutual agreement of the
parties to the employment relationship.2 The law imposed upon the employer a respon-
sibility for the employee's health, welfare, and security' and in return required that the
employee render loyal service to the employer.' Nineteenth century courts envisioned
the relational bond between employer and employee as an enduring one and expected
that both parties would remain committed to the arrangement until the term of services
ended." Where the parties did not specify a term of service, courts presumed that the
relationship would continue for one year.' Thus, under nineteenth century law an
employment relationship could not be terminated before the end of one year merely at
the will of the parties, but only for good cause."
By the mid-nineteenth century, courts began to discard their traditional approach
to the legal relationship between employers and employees in response to emerging
notions of freedom of contract and an increasing awareness of the economic value of
industrial growth." Courts began to enforce promises between employers and employees
only if they were accompanied by manifestations of mutual assent of the parties evi-
denced by express and definite contract terms." In addition, courts developed the
employment-at-will doctrine to address circumstances in which the parties had not en-
tered into an express agreement regarding the terms of employment." Under the
1 See Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in
Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1824 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Protecting At Will Employees]. See
also Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 119-22
(1976).
I P. SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 128, 123-24 (1969).
3 See Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Hawaii 370, 374, 652 1'.2d 625, 627 (198'2); J. KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 258-66 (1884); P. SELZNICK, supra note '2, at 128; Note, Protecting
At Will Employees, supra note 1, at 1824.
2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW '258 (1884).
5 Under the old rule, if the employee was hired for an unspecified time, the law would construe
the hiring as being for a term of one year. See P. SELZNICK, supra note 2, at 125. For a discussion
of this rule, see infra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
" P. SELZN1CK, supra note 2, at 125-26. Some nineteenth century writers continued to view the
master-servant relationship as one of domestic relations, characterized by ideas of protection and
loyalty akin to those dominating the marriage relationship, which courts widely held to be terminable
only for serious cause. Glendon & Lev, Changes in the Bonding of the Employment Relationship: An Essay
on the New Property, 20 B.C.L. REV. 457, 457-59 (1979).
Feinman, supra note 1, at 119-20; P. SELZNICK, supra note 2, at 125.
g P. SELZNICK, .supra note 2, at 126. See generally Feinman, supra note 1, at 119-22,
"See Parnar, 65 Hawaii at 374, 652 P.2d at 628.
i" Note, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 1, at 1825-26.
" See id.
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employment-at-will doctrine, courts held any employment relationship not subject to an
express agreement regarding the employment terms to be terminable at the will of either
party.' 2 By the beginning of the twentieth century, the employment-at-will doctrine
granted the employer an absolute right to discharge an at-will" employee in the absence
of an express employment contract for a specified term." Thus, an employer could
discharge an employee for good cause attributable to the employee's performance, for
bad cause based on the employer's improper motives, or for no particular cause."
Legislation and changes in the common law, however, have eroded considerably the
employment-at-will doctrine." Substantial national and state labor legislation in the
twentieth century, designed to protect employees from the whims of their employers,
has sharply curtailed the applicability of the employment-at-will doctrine.' 7 As a result,
courts have developed three common law theories to grant job security to the at-will
employee." Some courts have refused to uphold the discharge of an employee where
the discharge would violate a clearly mandated public policy." Other courts have imposed
12 Id. at 1825. Horace Wood first expressed the rule in 1877: "With us the rule is inflexible that
a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a
yearly hiring, the burden is on him to establish it by proof." H. Wool.), A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
MASTER AND SERVANT 134 at 272 (1877). Although this doctrine was formulated without judicial
support, "it was highly compatible with prevailing laissez-faire notions and was readily accepted by
the courts." Glendon & Lev, supra note 6, at 458.
0 An at-will employee is one who is hired for an indefinite term. See, e.g., Johnson v. National
Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 54, 551 P.2d 779, 781 (1976); Mau v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 207 Neb.
308, 313, 299 N.W.2d 147, 150 (1980).
' 4 Parnar, 65 Hawaii at 375, 652 P.2d at 628. The employer's discretion to terminate an at-will
employee remained almost completely unquestioned by the courts. See P. SELztkoctt, supra note 2, at
137; Note, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 1, at 1826. The United States Supreme Court,
during this period, expressed its support for this laissez-faire approach by striking down regulations
of the employment relationship which, according to the Court, violated the parties' freedom to
contract. Note, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 1, at 1826. The Supreme Court addressed
these concerns in Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1
(1915). For a discussion of Adair, see infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text. These decisions
elevated the employer's right to terminate at will to a constitutional status. Note, Protecting Employees
At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1933-34
(1983) thereinafter Note, The Public Policy Exception].
15 See Parnar, 65 Hawaii at 375, 652 P.2d at 628 (quoting Payne v. Western & Atlantic R.R., 81
Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other grounds; Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527 (1915)).
16 Id. at 375-76, 652 P.2d at 628; Note, The Public Policy Exception, supra note 14, at 1935. The
twentieth century has witnessed a realignment of the relative power of the employee and employer
as courts have narrowed the scope of the employment-at-will doctrine. See Glendon & Lev, supra
note 6, at 459. Professors Glendon and Lev observed that:
[RJecent changes in the laws governing the termination of employment are part of a
broader change in the bonding of the employment relationship, through which the
web of relations that bind an individual's job to him and, more subtly, bind him to his
job, is becoming tighter and more highly structured.
Id.
17 Parnar, 65 Hawaii at 375, 652 P.2d at 628. See, e.g., Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§
101-115 (1976); Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187
(1976); National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
18 See Note, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 1, at 1817.
19 See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839
(1980) (employee refused to participate in price-fixing scheme); Petermann v. International Bhd.
of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) (employee refused to testify falsely before
legislative committee); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (employee
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an implied-in-law 2° duty of good faith and fair dealing on employers, limiting their
freedom to terminate employment relationships in bad faith.21 More recently, other
courts have found implied employment contracts for at-will employees on the basis of
assurances made in employee manuals and personnel handbooks. 22
One of the objectives of judge-made and statutory laws governing the employment
relationship should be to balance the rights of the employer and employee. The em-
ployment-at-will doctrine created a distinct advantage for the employer over the non-
union employee by granting the employer freedom to terminate the employee at will."
Employment legislation" and judicial limitations on the employment-at-will doctrine"
have remedied in part the resulting imbalance in the employment relationship by shifting
the balance back in favor of the employee. The public policy and covenant of good faith
and fair dealing theories of recovery for wrongful discharge protect employees from
discharge for bad cause, but retain for the employer the right to terminate for good
cause or no cause. 26 The implied-in-fact contract theory goes even further by creating
potential barriers to discharging employees for no cause, thus limiting employers to
discharging employees only if they can show good cause. 27 The prospect of liability
under the implied-in-fact contract theory because of dismissals in response to changes
in business demands can seriously impair the employer's ability to function profitably.
Requiring the employer to show good cause under the implied-in-fact contract
theory without also requiring the employee to show that he or she relied to his or her
detriment on the employer's assurances effectively eliminates the employment-at-will
doctrine and unfairly burdens employers by limiting their flexibility in responding to
business changes." This note will discuss the rise and fall of the employment-at-will
doctrine and analyze the reasons for and advisability of its decline, most recently because
of the adoption of the implied-in-fact contract exception. The first section will review
the employment relationship before the employment-at-will doctrine emerged, the po-
litical and social attitudes which gave rise to the employment-at-will doctrine, and its
refused to date foreman); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P,2d 512 (1975) (employee dismissed
For going on jury duty). But see Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505
(1980) (no cause of action where physician employee refused to continue drug research and Failed
to identify public policy at issue).
'" Courts impose the implied-in-law term on the parties where there is no contract or where
the contract is silent, even if the parties did not intend that the term exist. See Lopatka, The Emerging
Law of Wrongful Discharge -- A Quadrennial Assessment of the Labor Law Issue of the 80's, 40 Bus. LAW.
I, 17 (1984).
21 See, e.g., Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980);
Fortune v. National Cash Register, 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977). In Massachusetts, courts
have found a cause of action for bad-faith termination when, inter alio, an employer's reason for
termination is contrary to public policy. See Siles v. Travenol Laboratories, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 354,
358, 433 N.E.2t1 103, 106 (1982).
" See, e.g., Finley v, Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 5 Conn. App. 394, 499 A.2d 64 (1985); Toussaint
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield or Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Woolley v.
Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257 (1985).
"See Peirce, Employee Termination At Will: A Principled Approach, 28 Vo.t.. L. REV. 1, 2 (1982).
See infra notes 66-77 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 78-197 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 85-11 I and accompanying text
" See infra notes 112-197 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 198-247 and accompanying text.
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application to employment relationships in an increasingly industrialized society." There-
after, the note will consider the decline of the employment-at-will doctrine brought about
by statutory changes to the employment relationship and by judicial application of the
public policy exception and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing:"
The note then will review the development of the implied-in-fact contract exception
to the employment-at-will doctrine" and explore the implications of widespread judicial
application of this exception to the at-will employment relationship." This note will
conclude that widespread adoption of the implied-in-fact contract exception, making
employers' policy statements legally binding without requiring a showing of the employ-
er's intent to be bound or the employee's reliance, would be unduly burdensome to
employers." The note also will conclude that extending the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing to prevent bad faith conduct by employers, and by legislatively adopting
modifications to the employment-at-will doctrine that would clarify the obligations of
the parties would better serve the interests of employers and employees."
II. THE GROWTH OF EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE
In the early nineteenth century, the English rule" that an employment relationship
that was established for an indefinite period was presumed to exist for a period of one
year governed employment relationships in the United States." Courts imposed a one-
year employment term to prevent seasonal lay-offs or desertions which threatened the
stability of an agrarian economy." Therefore, the employer and employee were con-
tractually bound to each other for a one-year period even in the absence of a formal
contract."
29 See infra notes 35-65 and accompanying text.
3° See infra notes 66-111 and accompanying text.
m See infra notes 112-97 and accompanying text,
32 See infra notes 198-247 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 212-20 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 238-47 and accompanying text.
35 For a discussion of the English law governing the employment relationship, see Feinman,
supra note 1, at 119-22.
36
 Id. See also Peirce, supra note 23, at 4; P. SELZNICK, supra note 2, at 125. In 1857, the New
York Court of Appeals acknowledged its adherence to the English rule, reasoning that this rule
would introduce an element of definiteness into the employment relationship. Davis v. Gorton, 16
N.Y. 255,257 (1857). And in Charles Smith's well-regarded treatise, which was the first in America
devoted entirely to the subject of master and servant, Smith reiterated this rule as applicable to all
servants. Feinman, supra note I, at 123.
Feinman, supra note 1, at 120. In an agrarian society, this rule made practical sense because
it prevented the injustice created by masters who sought the benefit of servants' labor during the
planting and harvest seasons, but discharged them subsequent to the harvest to avoid supporting
them during the winter months. Id. By the same reasoning, the master who supported servants
during- the winter season was likewise protected from the injustice brought about by servants who
left when their services were most needed. Id. The presumption that an indefinite hiring was a
hiring for one year was not limited to agricultural and domestic workers. The rule was effectively
extended to all classes of servants by the Statutes of Labourers, which prohibited a servant from
leaving employment or a master from discharging the servant before the end of a term, as well as
by other legislation. Id.
33 See, e.g., Peirce, supra note 23, at 4; Feinman, supra note 1, at 120. The rule became entrenched
in English law with Blackstone's pronouncement that such a rule was proper because it provided
mutual equitable benefit and protection to both the servant and the master by binding the two
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By the latter part of the nineteenth century, the English rule that presumed an
indefinite hiring was for one year became incompatible with notions of individualism
and freedom to contract evolving in the United States." In addition, the change in
employment relationships occasioned by the Industrial Revolution reduced the economic
dependence on the seasonal cycles typical of the agricultural sector:40 In response to
these changes in employment relations and political attitudes that accompanied the new
industrial society, courts discarded the English rule" in favor of a new rule that an
indefinite hiring was prima facie an at-will hiring, terminable at the will of either party
for any reason.42 Broad societal support for the change in the legal relationship between
employer and employee brought about by the employment-at-will doctrine was evidenced
by widespread acceptance of the doctrine:" Despite the absence of judicial authority: 14
the employment-at-will rule soon became the primary doctrine governing termination
of the employer-employee relationship:"
As applied, the employment-at-will doctrine established a presumption that parties
to an employment agreement were bound to the relationship only if' they clearly intended
together throughout the seasonal cycles of the year. 1 W. BLACKSTONF., COMMENTARIES 425. Black-
stone stated:
If the hiring be general, without any particular time limited, the law construes it to
be a hiring for a year, upon a principle of natural equity, that the servant shall serve,
and the master maintain him, throughout all the revolutions of the respective seasons,
as well when there is work to be done as when there is not.
Id.
39 See Peirce, supra note 23, at 4; Note, The Public Policy Exception, supra note 14, at 1933.
4° Peirce, supra note 23, at 4.
." Id. The status-based employment relationship of master and servant was discarded in the
late 1800's in favor of judicial insistence "on freedom of bargaining as the fundamental and
indispensable requisite of progress." Id. (quoting Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365,
366 (1921)).
H.G. Wood, a treatise writer, propounded the rule:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring
at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is on him
to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week, month or year, no time being
specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches that it was for a day
even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever time the party may serve [lit is an
indefinite hiring and is terminable at the will of either party, and in this respect there
is no distinction between domestic and other servants.
Wool), MASTER AND SERVANT, § 134 at 273 (1877). See also Parnar, 65 Hawaii at 374-75, 652 P.2d
at 628; Note, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 1, at 1825 & n.51.
43 See Feinman, supra note 1, at 126.
44 See id. Courts widely adopted this rule even though its propounder, H.G. Wood, provided
no valid legal support and no policy grounds for the proclamation. Wood's treatise on master and
servant lacked the painstaking, comprehensive scholarship of his previous works. The cases he
relied upon as direct support of his proposition in fact provided no such support. In addition, he
inaccurately represented that the English rule had no recent support in American courts and that
courts had applied the at-will rule inflexibly in the United States. Id. For a discussion of Wood's
treatise and the cases he relied upon, see Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L.
REV. 335, 341 & n.54 (1974) [hereinafter Note, Implied Contract Rights].
45 Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note 44, at 342-43. The courts that adopted the rule
generally did so by citing Wood's treatise directly, see, e.g., McCullough Iron Co. v. Carpenter, 67
Md. 554, 557, 11 A. 176, 178 (1887); Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 121, 42 N.E.
416, 417 (1895), but courts rarely provided their own reasoning. Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra
note 44, at 342. In Harrod v. Wineman, a court for the first time asserted that cases following
Wood's rule were too numerous to require citation. 146 Iowa 718, 720, 125 N.W. 812, 813 (1910).
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to be bound:16
 While the rule allowed employees the freedom to terminate employment
where they did not intend to be bound,47
 the employers gained a distinct benefit because
it permitted them to adjust their employment practices in response to business concerns: 111
Judicial acceptance of the employment-at-will doctrine effectively saddled employees
with the burden of overcoming the presumption that their employment was at-will: 19 By
the end of the nineteenth century, the at-will employment contract had become, in large
part, a legal device for guaranteeing to management the unilateral power to make rules
and exercise discretion in employment decisions. 99
In many early applications of the doctrine, where the courts found no express
agreement as to the duration of the employment, the courts upheld the discharge
summarily by recitation of the rules' Where the courts offered reasoned analysis rather
than doctrinal adherence to the rule, they pointed to the absence of either mutuality of
46 Note, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 1, at 1825. See also Peirce, supra note 23, at 5—
6.
" Peirce, supra note 23, at 5-6.
Murg & Scharman, Employment at Will Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the Rule?, 23 B.C.L. REV.
329, 335-36 (1982). See also P. SELZNtCK, supra note 2, at 135. Some writers have viewed the
employment-at-will doctrine as an expression of an evolving "freedom of enterprise" in recognition
of the rights of the employer to discharge employees without restraint. See Blumrosen, Workers'
Rights Against Employers and Unions: Justice Francis—A Judge For Our Season, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 480,
481 (1970), If employers were required to retain employees even when market demands slipped
and those employees were no longer needed, labor would essentially be a fixed cost, rather than a
variable cost of production. This would impede the free transfer of capital and the growth of the
economic system. Murg & Scharman, supra at 336.
4" Murg & Scharman, supra note 48, at 335. See Feinman, supra note 1, at 129. The employer's
freedom to terminate in response to changing demand in the marketplace effectively imposed the
costs of the business cycle on the employee. Murg & Scharman, supra note 48, at 336.
5" P. SELZNICK, supra note 2, at 135. Professor Selznick has argued that the application of the
employment-at-will doctrine is in fact at odds with the spirit of contractualism developing in society
at the time the doctrine became established in employment law:
[Title capacity of contract imagery to legitimate that power was not complete. In the
first place, a contract impliedly giving broad powers of decision to one party. and
establishing the subordination of another, was hardly an ordinary contract. It was at
best a Hobbesian social compact giving full discretion to the sovereign employer. This
violated the spirit of nineteenth century contractualism, which looked to voluntary
agreements, based on bargaining over specific terms, as the substitute for prescriptive
regulation by government ,
.	 .
In the end, most stress was laid on the theory that ownership carried with it the
right to freedom of contract, and any limitation of that freedom was a violation of the
rights of property. This brought the argument back to consensual agreement as the
foundation of managerial authority, an agreement tainted by the manifest inequality
of the parties and by the reservation of all discretion to management unless specifically
limited by a provision of the contract.
Id. at 136-37.
Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note 44, at 343-44. See, e.g., Martin, 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E.
416 (employee, despite ten years' service, failed to prove express term and therefore rule applied).
Mechanical application of the rule often produced questionable results. Note, Implied Contract Rights,
supra note 44, at 344 (citing Clarke v. Atlantic Stevedoring Co., 163 F. 423 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1908)
(200 black stevedores hired for permanent positions were discharged to make room for white
stevedores)).
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obligation" or consideration" in affirming the employer's right to terminate at will."
According to these courts, any rule that left the employee free to leave the employment
relationship while the employer remained bound as long as the employee performed
satisfactorily and desired to remain was lacking necessary mutuality." The consideration
requirement was based on the view that wages and other benefits fully compensated the
employee for performance of services, while a promise of job security was not enforceable
unless the employee provided additional consideration. 56 The employment-at-will rule
thus protected the employer's right to terminate at will where the employee was unable
to show the mutual intent of' the parties to be bound."
The employment-at-will doctrine was judicially applied without exception during
the close of the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth, 58 Courts recognized the
employer's right to discharge employees "for good cause, no cause, or even for cause
morally wrong"" uniformly throughout the nation.°°
This broad power to terminate at will gained constitutional stature during the first
half of the twentieth century. 61 In 1908, the United States Supreme Court, in Adair v.
United Slates," 2 struck down a federal statute prohibiting common carriers from dismissing
employees for union membership. The Court held that the constitutional protections of
liberty and property against deprivation without due process of law under the fifth
amendment restricted the government's ability to compel persons to perform services
for another or to accept or retain the services of another." According to the Court, an
employer must be allowed to terminate an employee for any reason and the employee
must remain free to quit for any reason, in the absence of a contractual arrangement to
52 See, e.g., Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas Syndicate, 174 La. 66, 69, 139 So. 760, 761 (1932) ("[I]f
the contract of employment be not binding on the employee ... then it cannot be binding on the
employer; there would he lack of 'mutuality.'").
" See, e.g., Pearson v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 332 F.2d 439, 441 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 914 (1964); Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co., 197 Minn. 291, 295-300, 266 N.W. 872,
874-76 (1936).
54 Peirce, supra note 23, at 5-6.
55 See Lopatka, supra note 20, at 18.
55 See generally Skagerberg, 197 Minn. at 300-03, 266 N.W. at 876-78.
57 See Lopatka, supra note 20, at 18.
58 Payne v. Western & Ad. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518 (1884), overruled on other grounds, Hutton v.
Waiters, 132 Tenn. 527 (1915). The Payne court stated,
[Mien must be. left, without interference, to buy and sell where they please, and to
discharge or retain employes [sic] at will for good cause or for no cause, or even for
had cause without thereby being guilty of an unlawful act per se. It is a right which
an employe [sicj may exercise in the same way, to the same extent, for the same cause
or want of cause as the employer.
Id. at 518-19. See also McLaughlin v. Ford Motor Co., 269 F.2d 120, 125 (6th Cir. 1959); Union
Labor Hosp. Ass'n v. Vance Redwood Lumber Co., 158 Cal. 551, 554, 112 P. 886, 888 (1910);
Laiken v. American Bank & Trust Co., 34 A.D.2d 514, 514, 308 N.Y.S. III, 112 (1969).
Parnar, 65 Hawaii at 375, 652 P.2c1 at 628 (quoting Payne, 82 Tenn. at 519-20).
6° Murg & Scharman, supra note 48, at 329. For a summary of cases throughout the United
States, see id. at 329-30 & n.2.
5 ' See Peirce, supra note 23, at 6.
52 208 U.S. 161, 174 (1908).
55 Id.
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the contrary." The Court continued to support constitutional protection of the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine for twenty-two years. 65
In summary, courts developed the employment-at-will doctrine in recognition of
the freedom of both employers and employees to enter into employment contracts. By
its strict application, the doctrine provided employers the right to discharge employees
for good cause, no cause, or even bad cause, in the absence of a contractual agreement
for a specified term of employment.
III. THE DECLINE OF THE AT-WILL DOCTRINE
Statutory protection of the right of employees to unionize and legislation aimed at
preventing employers' discrimination against protected classes of employees revolution-
64 Id, at 174-76. The Court stated,
While ... the rights of liberty and property guaranteed by the Constitution against
deprivation without due process of law, is subject to such reasonable restraints as the
common good or the general welfare may require, it is not within the functions of
government ... to compel any person in the course of his business and against his
will to perform personal services For another .... So the right of the employee to quit
the service of the employer, for whatever reason, is the same as the right of the
employer, for whatever reason, to dispense with the services of such employee ....
Id. at 174-75. The Court reaffirmed its insistence on laissez-faire principles in employment matters
seven years later in Coppage v. Kansas, where the Court struck down a state statute that prohibited
employers from refusing to hire union members. 236 U.S. 1 (1915). In Coppage, the Court reiterated
the importance of the constitutional protections of freedom of property embodied in the fifth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution as supportive of the employer's unre-
strained freedom of contract inherent in the employment-at-will doctrine. Id. at 17. In dissent,
Justice Day made it clear that, in his opinion, the majority decision failed to recognize the intent of
the legislation to promote the same liberty for the employee in selecting his or her affiliations as
the employer enjoys in making employment decisions. In his view,
[T]he act now under consideration, and kindred ones, are intended to promote the
same liberty of action for the employee as the employer confessedly enjoys. The law
should be as zealous to protect the constitutional liberty of the employee to make
lawful affiliations as he may desire with organizations of his choice. It should not be
necessary to the protection of the liberty of one citizen that the same right in another
citizen be abridged or destroyed.
Id. at 40 (Day, J., dissenting).
65
 Twenty-two years after its decision in Adair, the United States Supreme Court demonstrated
in Texas & New Orleans R.R. v. Bhd. of Railway and Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930), that
its support for the employer's unrestrained freedom to terminate employees for any reason had
declined. See Peirce, supra note 23, at 8. In upholding the constitutionality of the Railway Labor
Act of 1926, Ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (current version at U.S.C. §§ 151-162 (1976)), which
placed limitations on the employer's right to discharge employees for union membership, the
Supreme Court indicated that it no longer held inviolate the employer's fundamental right to do
with its property as it saw fit, including the indiscriminate hiring and firing of employees. Peirce,
supra note 23, at 8. The Texas & New Orleans R.R. Court stated,
[t]he Railway Labor Act of 1926 does not interfere with the normal exercise of the
right of the carrier to select its employees or to discharge them. The statute is not
aimed at this right of the employers but at the interference with the right of employees
to have representatives of their own choosing. As the carriers subject to the Act have
no constitutional right to interfere with the freedom of the employees in making their
selections, they cannot complain of the statute on constitutional grounds.
Texas & New Orleans R.R., 281 U.S. at 571 (emphasis added).
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ized the taw governing employment relations." Increased public regulation of the work-
place was intended to correct the imbalance in bargaining power between employers
and employees and thus provide greater protection to employees." The United States
Supreme Court considered this imbalance in bargaining power in deciding the consti-
tutionality of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 68 which provided protection of
workers' freedom of self-organization and designation of union representation." This
enactment withstood constitutional attack in the 1937 decision in National Labor Relations
Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation," in which the Court distinguished the normal
right of the employer to discharge employees from the use of that right to intimidate
or coerce employees." In upholding the Act, the Court indicated its concern for the
employee's lack of equal bargaining power in negotiating with the employer over the
terms of employment." By this decision, the Court acknowledged that freedom of
contract ideals could no longer be used to shield the employment relationship from
standards of fairness and social policy," and thus the Court upheld limitations on the
freedom of employers to terminate employment at will.
In addition, Congress and the states have enacted legislation that serves to modify
the employment-at-will doctrine by imposing restrictions on the freedom of employers
to discharge employees without limitation. For example, statutes prohibiting discrimi-
nation in employment" restrain employers from discharging employees for discrimi-
natory purposes." Other statutes" contain provisions protecting employees from dis-
charge for exercising their rights under the statutes." This legislation has altered the
06 P. SELZNICK, supra note 2, at 138. Much of the New Deal labor legislation, such as the National
Labor Relations Act, Ch. 372 § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. H 151-169 (1976)),
provided an impetus for increased unionization and consequently for limitations on the power of
the employers. Id. By virtue of collective bargaining agreements, union members are not at-will
employees and therefore remain insulated from changes in the employment-at-will doctrine.
67 See Murg & Scharman, supra note 48, at 338; Note, Protecting Ai Will Employees, supra note 1,
at 1827. For example, Congress has enacted legislation to promote unionization as a force against
employer power, see, e.g., Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. H 101-115 (1976); Labor Management
Relations (Taft•Hartley) Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. H 141-187 (1976); National Labor Relations (Wag-
ner) Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. H 151-169 (1976), establish a minimum level of economic entitlement
for employees, see, e.g., Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. H 3301-3311 (1976); Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. H 201-219 (1976), combat discrimination in employment prac-
tices, see, e.g., Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, protect employee
health and safety, see, e.g., Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84
Stat. 1590 (codified in various sections of 5, 15, 18, 29, 42, 49 U.S.C.), and guarantee a minimum
level of security for retirement and for the survivors of wage earners, see, e.g., Employment
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2, 88 Stat. 829 (codified in various
sections of 5, 18, 26, 29, 31, 42 U.S.C.).
"Ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. H 151-169 (1976)).
" 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
7" 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
71 Id. at 45-46.
72 Id. at 33.
" Peirce, supra note 23, at 9 & n.45.
74 See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. H 2000e-2000e-17 (1976).
Peirce, supra note 23, at 9-10.
7" See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. H 201-219 (1976); Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. H 651-678 (1978).
77
 See Peirce, supra note 23, at 10.
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employment relationship by limiting the employer's freedom to terminate employees
when the motivation for discharge is contrary to the public good.
The atmosphere of interventionism created by federal and state enactment of stat-
utes regulating the employment relationship has, over the last two decades, encouraged
courts to develop common-law exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine." Courts
viewed the emerging body of statutory modification of the employment relationship not
as defining the outer bounds of regulation but rather as a signal for the judiciary to
modify the common law to expand this protection." In an effort to limit the harshness
of the employment-at-will doctrine and return to employees some of the protections that
the rule had taken away, courts recognized causes of action for wrongful discharge as a
potential remedy for dismissed employees. 88 These courts have allowed discharged at-
will employees to bring actions for wrongfUl discharge based on one or more of three
theories: 8' public policy,82 covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 88 or implied-in-fact
contract.81
A. The Public Policy Exception
The public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine is the most widely
applied limitation of the employment-at-will doctrine. 86 Under this exception, an em-
ployee may have an enforceable contract or tort claim for damages against an employer
if it discharges the employee for reasons that undermine an important public policy. 86
78 See Lopatka, supra note 20, at 4.
79 Id. at 4. In Professor Lopatka's view,
[T]he courts that would change the common law conclude not that employer's [sic]
discharge rights remain unimpaired except as modified by this specifically focused
legislation, but rather that in the light of these numerous restrictions [on the employer's
freedom to terminate at will], it is appropriate for the judiciary to further constrain
the right of discharge.
Id.
" See generally Lopatka, supra note 20, at 2-6; Note, The Public Policy Exception, supra note 14.
el See Lopatka, supra note 20, at 6, 17.
See infra notes 85-97 and accompanying text.
Be See infra notes 98-114 and accompanying text.
64 See infra notes 111-97 and accompanying text.
63 Lopatka, supra note 20, at 6; Note, The Public Policy Exception, supra note 14, at 1931. Courts
in the following states have recognized or indicated their willingness to recognize the public policy
theory to some extent: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Car-
olina, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Lopatka, supra note 20, at 6-7 & n.30;
Another At-Will Employee Sues for Wrongful Discharge, 5 LAW. ALERT 30, 30 (1985) [hereinafter Another
At-Will Employee]. Not all courts have been willing to modify the common law by adopting the public
policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. See Brainerd v. Imperial Mfg. Co., 571 F.
Supp. 37 (D.R.I. 1983); Greenspan v. National Medical Care, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 311 (E.D. Va.
1980); Ivy v. Army Times Pub. Co., 428 A.2d 831 (D.C. App. 1981); Andress v. Augusta Nursing
Facilities, Inc., 156 Ga. App. 775, 275 S.E.2d 368 (1980). For example, the New York Court of
Appeals acknowledged the trend in other jurisdictions to provide a common-law remedy for
discharge in contravention of public policy, but declined to follow suit because "such a significant
change in our law is best left to the Legislature." Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58
N.Y.2d 293, 301, 448 N.E.2d 86, 89, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 235 (1983).
Note, The Public Policy Exception, supra note 14, at 1932.
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Establishing a claim , under the public policy exception requires a showing that the
employer's action is contrary to a "clearly defined and well-established" public policy."
In one of the earliest cases that considered the public policy exception, the California
Appeals Court in its 1959 decision in Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters"
imposed wrongful discharge liability on a labor union which had discharged an employee
after he refused to commit perjury at the employer's behest. The court looked to the
state penal code, which made the commission of perjury unlawful, and held that such a
discharge was in conflict with the public's interest in preventing perjury and the protec-
tion of that interest warranted judicial intervention. 89
Generally, courts look to constitutional and statutory law and to judicial decisions
for indications of public policy. 9° But a clear statement of the scope of the public policy
exception is difficult to formulate because each court confronted with the question has
put forth an interpretation of "public policy" different from the next.9 ' The cases in
which courts have found violations of public policy normally fall into distinct categories
of reasons for dismissa1. 92 The first category involves dismissal of employees for their
refusal to violate a statute, as in Petermann. 93 The second category includes dismissal in
retaliation for the employee's performance of a statutory or public obligation 8' such as
to Ward v. Frito -Lay, Inc., 95 Wis. 2d 372, 376, 290 N,W.2d 536, 538 (1980).
Bs 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 188-90, 344 P.2d 25, 27-28 (1959).
a9
	 at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 27. The Petermann court concluded that:
It would be obnoxious to the interests of the state and contrary to public policy and
sound morality to allow an employer to discharge any employee, whether the employ-
ment be for a designated or unspecified duration, on the ground that the employee
declined to commit perjury, an act specifically enjoined by statute.
Id.
" See, e.g., Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 130, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878;
Pierce, 84 N.J. at 72, 417 A.2d at 512.
gi Peirce, supra note 23, at 26. One court noted that:
R]he sources of public policy include legislation; administrative rules, regulations or
decisions; and judicial decisions. In certain instances, a professional code of ethics may
contain an expression of public policy .... Absent legislation, the judiciary must define
the cause of action in case-by-case determination.
Pierce, 84 N.J. at 72, 417 A.2d at 512. In this context, another court observed that:
the Achilles heel of the principle lies in the definition of public policy . , 	 In general,
it can be said that public policy concerns what is right and just and what affects the
citizens of the State collectively. It is to be found in the State's constitution and statutes
and, when they are silent, in its judicial decisions.
Palmateer, 85 III. 2d at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 878. In the seminal public policy decision, the Petermann
court recognized that "Whe term 'public policy' is inherently not subject to precise definition ....
Public policy is a vague expression and few cases can arise in which its application may not be
disputed." Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 188, 344 P.2d at 27.
92 Peirce, supra note 23, at 26-27; Note, The Public Policy Exception, supra note 14, at 1936-37.
93 Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) (refusal to commit perjury in legislative
hearings); see also Crossen v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1076 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (refusal
to engage in illegal business practices); McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
(refusal to participate in illegal price-fixing scheme); Tammy, 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164
Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980) (refusal to participate in price-fixing scheme in violation of state and federal
anti-trust laws); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo and Ironton R.R. Co., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d
385 (1978) (refusal to illegally alter pollution control reports).
94 See, e.g., Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat'l Bank West, 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1983) (being sub-
poenaed to testify at grand jury); Nees, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (performing jury duty); Reuther
v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978) (same). But see Bender Ship
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jury duty. 95 The third category involves dismissal because of the employee's exercise of
a statutory right or privilege," such as filing a workers' compensation claim.°
H. The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Courts have also upheld actions for wrongful discharge on the basis of the employer's
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing." In those jurisdictions which have
adopted the theory," courts enforce the covenant on a theory of implied-in-law con-
tract)" Implied-in-law contract terms arise from duties imposed by law on the parties
where the contract is silent or where there is no written contract, even if the the parties
did not intend the implied term. 01 In the employment relationship, the duty of good
faith and fair dealing requires that neither party do anything which would injure the
rights of the other to receive the benefits of the employment agreement. 102 Therefore,
a termination not made in good faith constitutes a breach of the implied-in-law con-
tract) 03
Some courts have used the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to prOtect at-will
employees from terminations that are intended to deprive them of certain benefits of
employment, such as commissions or pensions.'°' Liability for wrongful discharge in
Repair, Inc. v. Stevens, 379 So. 2d 594 (Ala. 1980) (dismissal for jury service upheld). This category
includes what are generally known as "whistle-blower" cases, referring to the actions of employees
who report criminal activity by their employers or fellow employees to the government. Murg &
Scharman, supra note 48, at 344 n.89. See, e.g., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn.
471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980) (quality control director attempted to correct, internally, false food
labeling); Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981) (employee supplied law enforcement
officials with information concerning criminal activity of another employee); Petrik v. Monarch
Printing Corp., 111 III. App. 3d 502, 444 N.E.2d 588 (1982) (vice-president reported suspicions
about embezzlement of corporate funds); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978)
(credit manager called superior's attention to illegal loan practices).
95 See, e.g., Nees, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512.
96 See, e.g., Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979) (refusing to
take polygraph test); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978) (same);
Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973) (filing workers' compen-
sation claim). But see Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (1977) (no cause of
action for dismissal for refusal to take psychological stress test); Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co.,
397 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1981) (no cause of action for dismissal for filing workers' compensation
claim).
97 See, e.g., Frampton, 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425.
98 See, e.g., Mitford v. LaSala, 666 P.2d 1000 (1983) (Alaska); Cleary, 111  Cal. App. 3d 443, 168
Cal. Rpm. 722 (California); Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., 193 Conn. 558, 479 A.2d 781 (1984)
(Connecticut); Fortune, 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Massachusetts); Dare v. Montana Petroleum
Marketing Co., 687 P.2d 1015 (Mont. 1984) (Montana); Mange, 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (New
Hampshire).
99 Courts have recognized the implied covenant exception, in one form or another, in the
following states: Alaska, California, Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, Montana and New Hamp-
shire. Another At-Will Employee, supra note 85, at 30.
too Lopatka, supra note 20, at 17.
to. Id.
162 Id. at 23. See also Fortune, 373 Mass. at 104, 364 N.E.2d at 1257.
193 Fortune, 373 Mass. at 101, 364 N.E.2d at 1256.
164 See Note, The Public Policy Exception, supra note 14, at 1935-36. See, e.g., Maddaloni v. Western
Mass. Bus Lines, 386 Mass. 877, 438 N.E.2d 351 (1982); Gram v. Liberty Mutual Ihs. Co., 384
Mass. 659, 429 N.E.2d 21 (1981); Fortune, 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977). In other decisions,
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these cases prevents the employer from taking financial advantage of the employee. 1 °5
For example, in a Massachusetts case, Fortune u. National Cash Register, 106 the employer
terminated a sales employee with twenty-live years' service the day after he was credited
with a sale entitling him to a $92,000 bonus. Despite express language in the employment
contract stating that the employment was terminable at will without cause, the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that where an employer terminated an employee
for the primary purpose of depriving that employee of commissions due for work
performed, the employer acted in bad faith. 1 ° 7 The court further held that a discharged
employee could recover damages for wrongful discharge on the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing where the employer terminated the employment relationship
in bad faith.'"
In other jurisdictions, courts apply the covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a
rough equivalent of the public policy exception I " to the employment-at-will doctrine."
In these jurisdictions, the employer is liable in contract for bad faith termination of an
at-will employee when the reason for discharging the employee is contrary to public
policy.'"
Thus, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in either form limits the scope of
the employment-at-will doctrine. By the implication at law of the employer's duty to act
in good faith, the employer is liable for wrongful discharge when he or she discharges
an employee in bad faith.
courts have invoked the good-faith covenant on other grounds to constrain the employer from
terminating an employee for other than good cause. See, e.g., Cleary, 111  Cal. App. 3d 443, 168
Cal. Rptr. 722 (lung service of employee gives rise to duty to terminate only for good cause); Gates
v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 638 l'.2(1 1063 (Mont. 1982) (employer bound under covenant to abide
by dismissal policies in handbook distributed after hiring plaintiff employee).
I " See Lopatka, supra note 20, at 24.
l°6 373 Mass. 96, 98-99, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1253-54 (1977).
' 07 1d. at 102, 364 N.E.2d at 1256. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated that
"where, as here, commissions are to be paid for work performed by the employee, the employer's
decision to terminate its at will employee should be made in good faith." Id.
'°"
	 at 101, 364 N.E.2d at 1255-56.
r°"
	 a discussion of the public policy exception, see supra notes 85-97 and accompanying
text.
"" See, e.g., Magnan, 193 Conn. 558, 479 A.2d 781; Sues, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 354, 433 N.E.2d
103; Howard v. Darr Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 914 A.2d 1273 (1980). The decision of the New
Hampshire Supreme Court in Howard, 120 N.H. 295, 414 A.2d 1273, in which the court held that
an employer is liable for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing when the discharge
violates public policy, narrowed its previous holding in Mange, 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549. The
Mange court found a breach of the implied covenant of' good faith and fair dealing for termination
of an at-will employee based on bad faith, malice, or retaliation. Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551. The
court held that the termination of an employee motivated by bad faith or retaliation for an act or
omission of the employee is not in the public's best interest. Id. The court noted the importance of
the public's interest in maintaining the proper balance between the employer's interest in running
its business as it sees fit and the employee's interest in retaining employment. Id. The Mange court
stated that a "termination by the employer of a contract of employment at will which is motivated
by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation is not in the best interest of the economic system or
the public good and constitutes a breach of the employment contract." Id.
1 " Sites, 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 358, 433 N.E.2d at 106. Under Massachusetts law, a plaintiff has
a claim for "bad faith" termination of an at-will employment contract if he or she can show "that
(1) the discharge involved an intent of the defendant to benefit financially at the plaintiff's expense
.. or (2) that the employer's reason for the discharge was contrary to public policy." Id.
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C. The Implied-in-Fact Contract Exception
More recently, courts in a number of jurisdictions have implied employment con-
tracts in at-will relationships on the basis of the employer's explicit or implicit statements
made within employment and personnel documents." 2
 These statements assure the
employee of continued employment given satisfactory work performance," 3 in the ab-
sence of just or good cause for dismissal," 4
 or subject to the employer's adherence to
stated dismissal procedures. 115 Courts have increasingly enforced these "implied-in-fact
contracts," previously given no legal effect, as binding. 16 Although the courts are divided
on whether to enforce implied-in-fact contracts, courts are more frequently favoring the
discharged employee and enforcing statements made in personnel manuals." 7
Strict application of the traditional employment-at-will rule has precluded recovery
in some cases brought by discharged employees who have relied in court on the implied-
in-fact contract theory. In these cases, employees alleged that statements in personnel
manuals 118
 formed the basis for an implied employment contract." 9
 The courts hesitated
to recognize' a cause of action for breach of the implied contract where there was no
" 5
 Murg & Scharman, supra note 48, at 367. Courts in the following states have recognized, to
varying degrees, actions for wrongful discharge based on breach of an implied contract arising
from assurances regarding job security made in personnel and policy manuals: Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Dakota and Washington. Courts in Arkansas and North Carolina 'have indicated their willingness
to adopt the exception. Lopatka, supra note 20, at 17 n.92; Another At-Will Employee, supra note 85,
at 30.
" 5 See, e.g., Eales v. Tanana Valley Medical-Surgical Group, Inc., 663 P.2d 958 (Alaska 1983)
(promise of employment until retirement age as long as employee properly performed duties);
Bondi v. Jewels by Edwar Ltd., 267 Cal. App. 2d 672, 73 Cal. Rptr, 494 (1968) (oral agreement to
employ as long as performance of duties is satisfactory).
114 See, e.g., Ryan v. Upchurch, 474 F. Supp. 211 (S.D. Ind. 1979); Comfort & Fleming Insurance
Brokers, Inc. v. Hoxsey, 26 Wash. App. 172, 613 P.2d 138 (1980).
" 5 See, e.g., Finley v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 5 Conn. App. 394, 499 A.2d 64 (1985); Pine
River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).
" 6 See Lopatka, supra note 20, at 17. Courts have traditionally enforced some promises made
in personnel policy manuals, such as promises to provide pensions, see, e.g., Hainline v. General
Motors Corp., 444 F.2d 1250 (6th Cir. 1971); Hindle v. Morrison Steel Co., 92 N.J. Super. 75, 223
A.2d 193 (1966), severance payments, see, e.g., Ingrassia v. Shell Oil Co., 394 F. Supp. 875 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Anthony v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 51 N.J. Super. 139, 143 A.2d 762 (1958),
bonuses, see, e.g., Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Rowland, 460 F.2d 697 (4th Cir. 1972), and seniority
systems, see, e.g., Wagner v. Sperry-Univac, 458 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Hepp v. Lockheed-
California Co., 86 Cal. App. 3d 714, 150 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1978). The distinction made, generally,
was that the work done and the benefits (pensions, severance pay, bonuses, etc.) and compensation
paid were the intended quid pro quo, Anthony, 51 N.J. Super. at 147, 143 A.2d at 766, while additional
consideration was required to support an employer's assurances of continued employment. See, e.g.,
McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111, 1119 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Brawthen v. H&R Block, Inc.,
52 Cal, App. 3d 139, 149, 124 Cal. Rptr. 845. 851 (1975); Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88
Wash. 2d 887, 894, 568 P.2d 764, 769 (1977).
1 " See Note, Employee Handbooks and Employment-At-Will Contracts, 1985 DUKE L.J. 196, 205 (1985)
[hereinafter Note, Employee Handbooks].
" 9 In some of these cases, the employee based a claim on the employer's failure to adhere to
company policy regarding performance evaluation and employee termination procedures. See, e.g.,
Beidler v. W.R. Grace, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 167 Incl.
App. 1, 328 N.E.2d 775 (1975).
" 5 See, e.g., Johnson, 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779; Mau, 207 Neb. 308, 299 N.W.2d 147.
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specific agreement between the parties as to the duration' 2° of employment. 121 In the
absence of an agreement, these courts found the employment was at-will and that either
party could terminate it at any time. 122 The reluctance of courts to treat provisions of
employment manuals as binding contracts was usually founded upon the absence of
mutual intent of the parties to be obligated to each other.'"
In other jurisdictions, in contrast, discharged employees have brought successful
wrongful discharge actions premised on the implied contract theory. In these cases the
courts showed a willingness to enforce statements assuring continued employment, in
the absence of good cause for termination, where there was a showing of additional
consideration in return for the granting of job security.' 24 Traditionally, the payment of
wages in return for the performance of services constituted the necessary exchange of
consideration in an employment contract. 125 Therefore, unless the employee provided
consideration in addition to the rendering of services, the employer could not be held
to an agreement to grant job security for life in addition to paying wages. 126 Separate
consideration served as an indication of the intention of the parties to enter into a long-
term, secure employment arrangement.'"
1" In some cases, dismissed employees brought causes of action contending that their employ-
ment arrangements were not at-will because a specific duration of employment could be implied
from employers' promises of "permanent" or "lifetime" employment or employment until retire-
ment. See, e.g., Bales, 663 P.2d 958; Degen v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., 260 Minn. 424, 110
N.W.2d 863 (1961); Piechowski v. Matarese, 54 N.J. Super. 333, 148 A.2d 872 (1959). Therefore,
these plaintiffs argued, the employer could not lawfully dismiss them before the end of the term
(i.e. upon death or retirement) except for good cause. The question of whether to construe these
verbal promises as establishing fixed or definite employment periods thereby bringing the employ-
ment relationship outside the purview of the employment-at-will doctrine confronted the courts.
Courts have treated this question as one of interpretation and application of the at-will rule,
requiring the trier of fact to ascertain the intentions of the parties to enter into long-term commit-
ments. See, e.g., Savarese v. Pyrene Mfg., Inc., 9 N.J. 595, 599-601, 89 A.2d 237, 239-40 (1952).
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Savarese refused to give contractual status to a promise of
lifetime employment stating that "agreements of this nature have not been upheld except where it
most convincingly appears it was the intent of the parties to enter into such lung-range commitments
and they must be clearly, specifically and definitely expressed." Id. at 601, 89 A.2d at 240.
121 See Lopatka, supra note 20, at 18. See, e.g., Seidler, 461 F. Supp. at 1015; Johnson, 220 Kan.
at 54, 551 P.2d at 781; Paisley v. Lucas, 346 Mo. 827, 842, 143 S.W.2d 262, 270 (1940); Savarese, 9
N.J. at 600-01, 89 A.2d at 239.
122 For example, in Johnson, the Kansas Supreme Court in 1976 held that the publication of a
personnel manual, absent an agreement as to the intended duration of employment, was no more
than a unilateral expression of the employer's policies and was not evidenced by bargaining between
the parties which would suggest a "meeting of the minds." Johnson, 220 Kan. at 55, 551 P.2d at
779. The court stated that it followed "the general rule that in the absence of a contract, express
or implied, between an employee and his employer covering the duration of employment, the
employment is terminable at the will of either party... ." Id. at 54, 551 P.2d at 781. See also Shaw,
167 Ind. App. at 5, 328 N.E.2d at 778.
'" See Lopatka, supra note 20, at 18. See also Savarese, 9 N.J. at 600-01, 89 A.2d at 239.
124 See, e.g., McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111, 1119 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Brawthen, 52
Cal. App. 3d 139, 124 Cal. Rptr. 845; Weber v. Perry, 210 S.C. 8, 21 S.E.2d 193 (1942); Roberts v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 568 P.2d 764 (1977). But cf. Albers v. Wilson & Co., 184
F. Supp. 812 (D. Minn. 1960) (employees' subjecting themselves to violence by breaking strike did
not constitute additional consideration); Cedarstrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 263 Minn. 520, 117 N.W.2d
213 (1962) (loans to employer did not constitute additional consideration).
123 Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note 44, at 351-52.
126 See id.
' 27 Id. Examples of additional consideration deemed adequate to support a promise of job
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More recent cases have evidenced a trend toward application of the implied-in-fact
contract exception even where no separate consideration was clearly present.'" In these
cases, courts have viewed consideration not as a substantive requirement but rather as a
representation of the parties' intentions.'" Consequently, the courts look not for addi-
tional consideration but for indications of the intent of the parties to be bound to the
employment relationship.'" In 1980, the Michigan Supreme Court was one of the first
courts to find an implied-in-fact contract without separate consideration in Toussaint v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan. 131 The Toussaint court held that statements contained
in employment manuals may be contractually binding even when the employment is at-
will' 32
 and even when the employee has not relied on those statements.'"
In Toussaint, the employee specifically discussed the issue of job security with his
employer and as a result the employer told him that he would be with the company as
long as he did his job.' 34
 The employer also gave him a personnel policy manual which
reinforced the oral assurance of continued employment by its indication that the com-
pany's policy was to discharge "for just cause only."'" The employer discharged Tous-
saint after-five years of employment, and he filed suit against his employer claiming that
his discharge violated the employment agreement.'"
The Touissant court held that where employment is at-will, discharge provisions in
an employment manual are enforceable and may become part of the employment
contract either by express oral or written agreement or based on the legitimate expec-
tations of employees arising from the employer's policy statements.'" The court declined
security include the employee providing some benefit to the employer, see, e.g., Pierce v. Tennessee
Coal, Iron & R.R., 173 U.S. 1 (1898) (employee surrendered tort claim against employer); Downes
v. Poncet, 38 Misc. 799, 78 N.Y.S. 883 (N.Y. City Ct. 1902) (employee hired subject to his bringing
large business account to new employer); Ward v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 480 S.W.2d 483 (Texas
1972) (employee with special expertise needed by employer accepted salary below market rate), or
the employee relying on the employer's promise to the employee's detriment, see, e.g., Bondi, 267
Cal. App. 2d 672, 73 Cal. Rptr. 494 (employee's loss of own business through sale of business to
third party); Epps Air Serv., Inc. v. Lampkin, 125 Ga. App. 779, 189 S.E.2d 127 (1972) (employee's
loss of own business by sale of business to employer).
1" See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d
880 (1980); Woolley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257 (1985).
1" See Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 600, 292 N.W.2d at 885.
150 See id.
' 3 ' 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980). The Michigan Supreme Court decided Toussaint
along with Ebling v. Masco Corp., unreported opinion (Docket No. 29916, November 9, 1977).
' 37
 Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 598, 292 N.W.2d at 885.
133 Id. at 613, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
"4 Id. at 612, 292 N.W.2d at 891.
I" Id. at 597, 292 N.W.2d at 884.
16 Id. at 595, 292 N.W.2d at 883. The trial court rendered judgment for the employee on his
claim that his discharge violated the employment agreement, as contained in the policy manual,
which permitted discharge only for just cause. Id. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed on the
basis of a strict employment-at-will rationale, stating that "a contract of indefinite duration cannot
be made other than terminable at will by a provision that states that an employee will not be
discharged except for cause." Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 79 Mich. App.
429, 435, 262 N.W.2d 898, 851 (1977). •
" Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 598, 292 N.W.2d at 885. The Michigan Supreme Court held,
1) a provision of an employment contract providing that an employee shall not
be discharged except for cause is legally enforceable although the contract is not for
a definite term — the term is "indefinite," and
2) such a provision may become part of the contract either by express agreement,
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to accept the employer's argument that the traditional employment-at-will doctrine cre-
ated a substantive barrier to upholding the enforceability of provisions of an employee
policy manual.'" The court held that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to have
concluded that Blue Cross & Blue Shield had violated the plaintiff's employment
contract's and reinstated a verdict for damages of $72,835. 140
The Touissonl court stated that the employment-at-will rule is one of construction
rather than substantive law"' and agreed with the defendant's position that an employ-
ment agreement for an indefinite period is presumptively at-will." 2 The court went on,
however, to ask whether the employment must remain terminable at the will of either
party, thereby precluding the employer from entering into a legally enforceable agree-
ment to discharge an employee only for just cause."s While noting that employers can
establish policies requiring employees to acknowledge their employment status as at-
will, 14 the court concluded that it could see no reason why an employment relationship,
technically at-will, could not by an employer's promise provide job security."s According
to the court, then, the employer's freedom to terminate an at-will employee can give
way to an express or *plied agreement to the contrary.
The Michigan Supreme Court went on to further clarify the nature of the obligation
imposed on the employer. The court noted that there need not be bargaining between
the parties nor a meeting of the minds for an implied-in-fact contract to arise.' 8
 More-
over, according to the court, the employee need not know any of the details of the
oral or written, or as a result of an employee's legitimate expectations grounded in an
employer's policy statements ....
Id.
130 Id. at 599-612, 292 N.W.2d at 885-91. The defendant employer argued:
It is settled Michigan law that employment contracts For an indefinite term are ter-
minable at the will of either party unless the employee has furnished consideration to
his employer other than his services. A promise by an employer to discharge only for
an obviously determinable cause represents such a departure from firmly established
doctrines of contract formation and the normal expectations accompanying an indef-
inite employment relationship that it should require separate and distinct consideration
in order to be enforceable.
Id. at 599, 292 N.W.2d at 885.
"9 Id. at 620-21, 292 N.W.2d at 895.
" D Id. at 595, 292 N.W.2d at 883.
141 Id. at 600, 292 N.W.2d at 885.
"2 Id. at 599, 292 N.W.2d at 885. The defendant argued that the plaintiff's employment was
therefore terminable at the will of either party, oral agreements to the contrary notwithstanding.
The defendant further contended that to require the employer to continue the relationship as long
as the employee was willing to work, while the employee was free to quit at any time, was an
unacceptable alternative. Id. The defendant stated,
, . [wihere a definite term of employment is specified, each party has furnished consid-
eration by limiting his right to terminate the relationship at will, but where one party
(the employer) obligates himself to continue the relationship as long as the other
, desires and the other (the employee) reserves the right to terminate at will, there is
no mutuality of obligation and so the agreement must fail for lack of consideration.
Id.
"5 Id. at 609, 292 N.W.2d at 890 (emphasis in original).
114 Id. at 612, 292 N.W.2d at 891.
"s Id. at 610, 292 N.W.2d at 890. Contra Mau, 207 Neb. at 314-15, 299 N.W.2d at 151 (even
if personnel publications constituted part of employment contract, in absence of agreement that
employment is for definite period of time employment relationship remains terminable at the will
of the employer).
"s Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 613, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
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employer's policies and practices or even know of the existence of the policy manual at
the time of hiring and the policy manual need not refer to the specific employee, his or
her job description, or compensation. 147
 Because the obligation of the employer exists
even if the employee first learns of the manual after hiring, it is unnecessary for the
employee to show that he or she relied to his or her detriment on the employer's
statements. 148
After refusing to require that employees show reliance to establish an implied-in-
fact contract, the Touissaint court went on to discuss whether the implied contract theory
requires employees to show mutuality of obligation or consideration to recover. Accord-
ing to the court, enforceability of a contractual agreement implied from an employment
manual requires a showing of the parties' intent to become bound, rather than that the
parties actually are mutually bound to the employment relationship.' The court found
the defendant employer's intent to be bound by the mere inclusion of the good cause
provisions in the policy manual, presumably with the goal of enhancing the employment
relationship. 150
 The court acknowledged that the employer need not establish personnel
policies or distribute personnel manuals that could then form the basis of this obligation.
However, the Touissant court justified the imposition of this unilateral obligation where
the employer chooses to establish such policies because the employer, by doing so, obtains
in return a work force that is orderly, cooperative, and loyal.'"
The Touissant court then addressed the issue of sufficiency of consideration. The
court recognized that the "enforceability of a contract depends . on consideration,"
but viewed this as a rule of construction rather than substantive law.'" The court found
that the lesson of earlier cases was that the search for consideration was in truth an
attempt to discover and implement the parties' intentions.'" The court, then, acknowl-
edged the need for consideration but demonstrated its willingness to loök to the unilateral
intentions of the employer as a guide to enforcing implied contract provisions.'" The
court proceeded to discover intent in the employer's obtaining an enhanced employment
relationship, but held that "good cause" provisions benefited all employees, even if they
were unaware of their existence.'" By its holding, the Touissaia court placed little em-
phasis on the employee's reliance on the employer's promises and greater emphasis on
the benefits attained by the employer in making such assurances.
"7 Id.
148 1d. at 613 & n.25, 292 N.W.2d at 892 & n.25. The court refused to accept the distinction
made in a companion case, Ebling v. Masco Corp., unreported opinion (Docket No. 29916, Novem-
ber 9, 1977), between statements concerning compensation and statements assuring job security, to
the effect that the former are enforceable because the employer should reasonably expect that the
promise would induce reliance by the employee. Toussaint, 408 Mich, at 598, 292 N.W.2d at 884.
The court professed an inability to understand "why an employer should reasonably expect that a
promise of deferred compensation would induce reliance while a promise of job security would
not." Id.
149
 Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 600, 292 N.W.2d at 885.
1" Ste id. at 613, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
191 Id,
L52
 Id. at 600, 292 N.W.2d at 885.
153 Id.
L54 Id. at 613, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
L55 See id. at 613-15, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
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In contrast, the Court of Appeals of New York in Weiner v. McGraw -Hill, Inc.,' 56
viewed the presence of consideration as a "fundamental requisite" for the enforceability
of provisions of personnel manuals. In Weiner, McGraw-Hill invited the plaintiff to
consider employment with the firm and assured him that the company's policy not to
terminate employees without good cause would provide him with job security.' 57 The
court found that the employee's reliance on the assurance of job security as an induce-
ment to leave his previous employer was sufficient consideration to support an implied-
in-fact contract containing a promise of job security.'" In so holding, the court consid-
ered the intentions of the employer and employee and acknowledged that the value of
the consideration given in exchange for the assurance of job security may be negligible,
but held that consideration was required as an indication of the employee's intent to
enter into a long-term employment arrangement.'"
Other courts have deemed the consideration requirement , '" satisfied by finding
consideration in the employee's continuing to stay on the job, although free to leave
because the employment was at will.' 6 ' These courts reason that the employer's assur-
ances of continued employment unless the employer had good cause for discharge
constitutes an offer to the employee to enter into a unilateral contract, and the employee's
continued work in the absence of an obligation to do so constitutes acceptance of the
offer. 162
Many courts have relied upon unilateral contract formation analysis to support an
employee's claim for wrongful discharge.'" The Supreme Court of Minnesota employed
this approach in its 1983 decision in Pine River State Bank v. Mettille.'m The court specified
that, as a question of fact to be determined by the finder of fact, statements made in
personnel manuals may create a binding unilateral contract if the statements constitute
a promise in the form of an offer and the employee accepts them. 165 The Pine River
1 N 57 N.Y.2d 458, 463-65, 443 N.E.2d 441, 444-45 (1982).
157
	
at 460, 443 N.E.2d at 442.
166 Id. at 465-66, 443 N.E.2d at 445.
w See id. at 464-65, 443 N.E.2d at 445.
16° In the view of one writer,
the use of the separate consideration concept to justify enforcement of these contracts
is, of course, artificial. There is no obvious reason why a promise of employment
should be broken down into two separate parts — one to employ and one to employ
permanently — each of which must have separate consideration. In reality, the concept
is nothing more than a rationale for giving effect to the objective intentions of the
parties.
Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note 44, at 351 n.113. The showing of additional consideration,
then, creates the inference that it was the intent of the parties to enter into a long-term commitment:
the employee would not sell his or her business or relocate his or her family unless there was a
mutual understanding of continued employment. See id. at 354 & n.126.
161 See, e.g., Brooks v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 805, 809 (D. Colo. 1983); Salimi
v. Farmers Ins. Group, 684 P.2d 264, 265 (Colo. 1984); Martin, 109 111. App. 3d at 603, 440 N.E.2d
at 1004 (1982); Pine River State Bank, 333 N.W.2d at 627; Woolley, 99 N.J. at 302, 491 A.2d at 1267.
162 See, e.g., Woolley, Inc., 99 N.J. at 302, 491 A.2d at 1267; Pine River State Bank, 333 N.W.2d
at 627.
16° See, e.g., Wagner, 458 F. Supp. at 521; Finley, 5 Conn. App. at 409-10, 499 A.2d at 74; Pine
River State Bank, 333 N.W.2d at 627.
' 164 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).
165 Id. at 626.
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State Bank court held that the employee's continued employment while free to leave may
constitute acceptance even if the employment manual is published and distributed to the
employee after employment has begun.' 66 This analysis is consistent with conclusions
reached in other jurisdictions. 167 In this context, courts have found acceptance on the
basis of the employee's decision to leave a former employer, decline other job offers, or
simply accept a position with an employer making such promises.' 68
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court of New Jersey considered the implied-in-
fact contract exception and adopted conclusions consistent with those of the Toussaint' 69
court. In Woolley v. Hoffman -LaRoche, Inc.,'" the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed
the question of whether an implied promise in an employment manual that an employer
would fire an employee only for good cause was enforceable in an at-will employment
relationship. The court found that absent a clear and prominent disclaimer, such prom-
ises are enforceable against the employer even when the employment is for a period of
indefinite duration.' 71
Defendant Hoffman-LaRoche hired the plaintiff in Woolley as an engineer to begin
work in November 1969.' 72 The parties did not enter into a written employment contract,
and the plaintiff did not receive nor read the personnel manual that provided the basis
for his claims until he had been working for three months. Hoffman-LaRoche terminated
the plaintiff, after repeated requests for his resignation, because of a lack of confidence
in plaintiff's work. Woolley subsequently filed a complaint for breach of contract.m
Woolley claimed that the defendant's employment manual created an employment
contract under which Hoffman-LaRoche could lire him only for cause, notwithstanding
that the employment was for indefinite duration, because the types of termination set
forth within the policy manual did not include discharge without cause. 174
 Further,
Woolley alleged that his dismissal was not for good cause and therefore constituted a
breach of the implied contract.'m
Relying on a number of early New jersey decisions, the trial court granted summary
judgment for the defendant, holding that because the personnel policy manual contained
no clear expression of the intent of the parties to enter into a long-term arrangement
and because there was no additional consideration to support a promise of job security,
the employment remained terminable at wiIL 17C The Appellate Division affirmed the
166 Id. at 627.
162 See, e.g., Finley, 5 Conn. App. 394, 499 A.2d 64; Woolley, 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257; Weiner
v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441 (1982).
162 See, e.g., Brooks, 574 F. Supp. at 809 (employee accepted employment with understanding
that management decisions would be made in accordance with policy manual); Martin, 109 III. App.
3d at 602-03, 940 N.E.2d at 1003-04 (employee declined more lucrative job offer).
'69 For a discussion of Toussaint, see supra notes 131-51 and accompanying text.
1 " 99 N.J. 284, 285-86, 491 A.2d 1257, 1258 (1985).
" 1 Id.
"2 Id. at 286, 491 A.2d at 1258.
"3 Id.
124 Id. at 286-87 & n.2, 491 A.2d at 1258-59 & n.2. The employment manual identified five
types of termination: layoff, discharge due to performance, disciplinary discharge, retirement, and
resignation. The manual also stated that lilt is the policy of Hoffman-LaRoche to retain to the
extent consistent with company requirements, the services of all employees who perform their
duties efficiently and effectively." Id. at 287 n.2, 491 A.2d at 1259 n.2.
' 75 Id. at 287, 491 A.2d at 1258.
16 Id. at 288-89, 491 A.2d at 1259. Hoffman-LaRoche contended that the requisites For
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trial court decision on identical grounds, stating that the personnel manual was a uni-
lateral expression of company policy not evidenced by bargaining between the parties.'"
That court further held that the distribution of the personnel manual gave the plaintiff
no enforceable rights'" and noted its objections on public policy grounds to the creation
of lifetime employment contracts. 17"
On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that an implied promise in an
employment manual that the employer would fire employees only for good cause may
be enforceable against the employer even when the employment is otherwise terminable
at The court reversed the lower courts and remanded the case for trial."" The
Woolley court considered not only whether the employer could discharge the plaintiff
without cause, but also whether the answer to that question should be based on sole and
strict application of traditional contract doctrine.'" The court held that when an em-
ployer with a substantial number of employees distributes to those employees a manual
with job security provisions that are "incident[s] of employment," these provisions should
be construed according to the "reasonable expectations of the employees" and therefore
may be found to be binding.'" The Woolley court reasoned that strict contract analysis
should give way to an examination of the underlying interests of the parties in the
employment relationship.'"
In reaching this conclusion, the court placed great emphasis on the changing socio-
economic environment as a factor in the reassessment of the traditional employment-at-
will rule."115. It pointed to both legislative and judicial actions which limit the impact of
the traditional employment-at-will doctrine when it conflicts with society's interests)" In
formation of a contract of the type the plaintiff claimed existed were not present and consequently
the claim must fail. Id. at 288, 491 A.2d at 1259. The defendant argued that the plaintiff had not
specified the duration, as well as other terms of employment, and therefore under New Jersey law,
the employment was at will. Id. Further, the defendant contended that the plaintiff had not clearly
and convincingly shown the intent of the parties to enter into a long-term relationship. Id. Finally,
the defendant argued that the consideration, in addition to the employee's continued work, nec-
essary to support enforceability of employment manual provisions was lacking. Id. The trial court,
in granting summary judgment for the defendant, relied on Savarese, 9 N.J. 595, 89 A.2d 237,
Hindle v. Morrison Steel Co., 92 N.J. Super. 75, 223 A.2d 193 (App. Div. 1966), and Piechowski v.
Matarese, 54 N.J. Super. 333, 148 A.2d 872 (App. Div. 1959). Woolley, 99 N.J. at 288-89, 491 A.2d
at 1259.
177 Woolley, 99 N.J. at 289, 491 A.2d at 1259-60.
178 The New Jersey Supreme Court read the decision of the Appellate Division as suggesting
that only provisions such as those involving severance pay might lead to enforceable contractual
rights. Id. at 289, 491 A.2d at 1260.
'28 Id,
Id. at 285-86, 491 A.2d at 1258.
181 Id. at 307, 491 A.2d at 1269.
'82 /d. at 289-90, 491 A.2d at 1260.
187 Id. at 297-98, 491 A.2d at 1264.
184 Id. at 291-92, 491 A.2d at 1261-62. Notwithstanding this conclusion, the court stated that
"a jury, properly instructed, could find, in strict contract terms, that the manual ... set forth terms
and conditions of employment." Id. at 298, 491 A.2d at 1265.
182 Id. at 291-92, 491 A.2d at 1261.
'" Id. at 290-92, 491 A.2d at 1260-61. The New Jersey Supreme Court stated:
ttlhe Legislature here, as in most states, has limited the at-will rule to the extent that
it conflicts with the policies of our various civil rights laws
This Court has clearly announced its unwillingness to continue to adhere to rules
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addition, the court viewed changes in organizational structure and growth in the number
of employees within employer organizations as factors which necessitate rethinking of
the traditional employment-at-will doctrine."' The Woolley court indicated its willingness
to modify the traditional doctrine by its statement that the rule "must be tested by its
legitimacy today and not by its acceptance yesterday.""s
In the Woolley court's view, courts that hold that policy manual provisions do not
give rise to enforceable contractual obligations mistakenly view the claimed promise of
job security as one intended to establish individual contracts for lifetime or long-term
employment for employees. ►  In contrast, the Woolley court viewed the policy manual
provisions not as creating individual lifetime contracts but, rather, as creating a contract
for an indefinite term for a group of employees which the employer may not terminate,
except for good cause.'" The court found, therefore, that the traditional requirements
of specificity of terms and separate consideration are inapplicable in the group contract
situation. i 91
 Further, the court viewed the policy manual as an attempt to avoid a collective
bargaining agreement.'" The rationale for distributing a policy manual that includes
regularly leading to the conclusion that an employer can fire an employee-at-will, with
or without cause, for any reason whatsoever.
Id. at 290-91, 491 A.2d at 1260. It cited its 1980 decision in Pierce, where it recognized that "[t]he
interests of employees, employers and the public lead to the conclusion that the common law of
New Jersey should limit the right of an employer to fire an employee at will." Id. at 291, 491 A.2d
at 1261 (quoting Pierce, 84 N.J. at 71, 417 A.2d at 511).
1 " Woolley, 99 N.J. at 292, 491 A.2d at 1261-62. Quoting its earlier decision in Pierce, the
Woolley court stated,
In the last century, the common law developed in a laissez-faire climate that encour-
aged industrial growth and approved the right of an employer to control his own
business, including the right to fire without cause an employee at will .... The
twentieth century has witnessed significant changes in socioeconomic values that have
led to reassessment of the common law rule. Businesses have evolved from small and
medium size firms to gigantic corporations in which ownership is separate from
management. Formerly there was a clear delineation between employers, who fre-
quently were owners of their own businesses, and employees. The employer in the
old sense has been replaced by a superior in the corporate hierarchy who is himself
an employee. We are a nation of employees. Growth in the number of employees has
been accompanied by increasing recognition of the need for stability in labor relations.
Id. at 292, 491 A.2d at 1261 (quoting Pierce, 84 N.J. at 66, 417 A.2d at 509).
188 Id. at 292, 491 A.2d at 1262.
1" Id. at 292-95, 491 A.2d at 1262-63. In so viewing wrongful discharge claims, the New
Jersey Supreme Court noted that these courts have held that a valid, express contract not to
discharge except for good cause must exist if policy manual provisions are to be enforceable. Thus,
the agreement must clearly specify the terms, including the duration, and consideration in addition
to continued work must support the promise of job security. Id. at 293, 491 A.2d at 1262.
' 9° Id. at 295-96, 491 A.2d at 1263-64. The court stated that "[w]hat is before us in this case
is not a special contract with a particular employee, but a general agreement covering all employees."
Id. at 296, 491 A.2d at 1264.
191 Id. at 293, 491 A.2d at 1262. Nevertheless, the court found consideration in the employee's
continued work while under no obligation to do so, id. at 302, 491 A.2d at 1267, and abandoned
any requirement of a showing of reliance by holding that the unilateral contract becomes binding
upon distribution of the employment manual and extends to all employees, including those who
never read it and those who were not even aware of its existence. Id. at 302-04 & n.10, 491 A.2d
at 1267-68 & n.10. In general, the Woolley court applied a unilateral contract analysis similar to
that employed by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Pine River State Bank, 333 N.W.2d 622.
194
 Woolley, 99 N.J. at 296, 491 A.2d at 1264.
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provisions regarding job security, the court noted, is the employer's realization that the
failure to do so could lead to collective bargaining and subsequently collective bargaining
agreements. 195
Given the size of the company and the number of persons employed there without
benefit of a contract, the court concluded that it is reasonable to assume that the
personnel policy manual constitutes the most reliable statement of the terms of employ-
ment.'" In addition, the Woolley court found that the importance to employees of job
security as addressed within the employment manual made it even more vital to hold
the employer to those provisions as understood by the employees, regardless of the
employer's true intentions,'" The court presumed reliance in the case of an employee
who had no awareness of the policy manual provisions to avoid the inequity that would
result if some employees were protected while others were not) Finally, the Woolley
court noted that where an employer chooses not to be bound by the provisions of its
personnel policy manuals, the employer could include a disclaimer in a prominent place
in the manual asserting its right to discharge at will. 197
Thus the group contract analysis fashioned by the Woolley court extended to non-
union employees protections similar to those available in collective bargaining agree-
ments. While other courts have not adopted the Woolley analysis, the expansive language
is indicative of the trend towards greater protection of the employee from wrongful
discharge.
IV. THE DEMISE OF THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE?
The increasing judicial acceptance of the implied-in-fact contract exception consti-
tutes an attack on the traditional employment-at-will doctrine and may present a greater
challenge to that doctrine than have other judicial exceptions.'" The public policy
exception encourages employers to approach termination decisions in accordance with
generally accepted societal ideas about appropriate conduct in these situations.'" This
exception does not disable the employer in its efforts to run the business efficiently; it
only requires that the employer conduct business in proper accordance with the interests
of society. 2" Similarly, the judicially imposed covenant of good faith and fair dealing
imposes upon the employer the duty to conduct business affairs, with respect to em-
ployment practices, fairly and equitably. 20 I Both exceptions protect the employer's free-
dom to terminate for good cause, but neither exception restricts the employer's right to
1 " Id. at 296-97, 491 A.2d at 1264.
194 Id. at 298-99, 491 A.2d at 1265.
125 Id. at 300, 491 A.2d at 1266.
196 Id. at 302-04 & n.10, 491 A.2d at 1267-68 & n.10.
197 Id. at 309, 491 A.2d at 1271. This caveat is consistent with decisions by courts in other
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Crain v. Burroughs Corp, 560 F. Supp. 849, 852 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Finley, 5
Conn. App. at 412, 499 A.2d at 75; Toussaint, 408'Mich. at 624, 292 N.W.2d at 897; Pine River State
Bank, 333 N.W.2d at 627 (Minn. 1983).
12° See Lopatka, supra note 20, at 17.
1" For a discussion of the public policy exception, see supra notes 85-97 and accompanying
text.
20° Id.
201 For a discussion of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, see supra notes 98-
110 and accompanying text.
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discharge for no cause, such as a layoff due to lack of work. 282 Thus, both exceptions,
as modifications to the employment-at-will rule, seek to maintain a balance between the
interests of employees and employers as well as those of society in general." 3
In contrast, the implied-in-fact contract exception goes beyond the modification
brought about by judicial adoption of the public policy and good faith exceptions and
provides a degree of job security not enjoyed by non-union employees since the emer-
gence of the employment-at-will doctrine. 706
 Where an employee can point to statements
in personnel policy and procedure manuals that might lead a jury to conclude the
employee legitimately expected job security in the absence of a showing of good cause
for termination, the implied-in-fact contract theory may bind the employer, without
good cause to discharge, to continue the employment relationship as long as the employee
desires even though the employee is not similarly bound. 203
 The benefit to employees is
gained at the expense of the employer's right to discharge employees in response to
changes in business demands, as would occur in lack-of-work layoff situations, by re-
stricting the employer's freedom to terminate for no cause attributable to the employee's
performance. 408
Given the prevalent use of personnel policy manuals that could give rise to an
implied-in-fact contract and the practical problems involved in removing all statements
that might be construed as assuring continued employment,20 widespread judicial adop-
tion of the implied-in-fact contract exception may lead to the disappearance of the
traditional employment-at-will doctrine. If the courts widely adopt the implied-in-fact
contract exception, the judicial presumption that employees hired for an unspecified
term are entitled to job security will effectively displace the presumption that an indefinite
hiring is at will.408
Taking this proposition even further, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Woolley v.
Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 209
 reasoned that because the implicit rationale for including such
statements in personnel documents and distributing them to employees is avoidance of
unionization and collective bargaining agreements, courts should give commitments
purportedly made in these documents the same force as collective bargaining .agree-
ments.2" The Woolley court viewed job security as so fundamental a protection for
292 See supra notes 85-111 and accompanying text.
sos Monge, 114 N.H. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551.
2°4 See Lopatka, supra note 20, at 17.
"5 See Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 614, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
206 See supra notes 112-97 and accompanying text.
207 See Lopatka, supra note 20, at 17.
208
 For a discussion of the presumptions behind the employment-at-will doctrine, see supra notes
35-65 and accompanying text.
209 For a discussion of Woolley, see supra notes 170-97 and accompanying text.
410  See Woolley, 99 N.J. at 296-97, 491 A.2d at 1264 (dicta). As Professors Murg and Scharman
warned,
for the first time, the more than eighty million non-unionized employees in this country
may be accorded the protection of job security which the unionized sector of the
workforce traditionally has enjoyed.
Indeed, in its practical application, providing for the enforcement of such prom-
ises could afford non-unionized employees greater job security than unionized em-
ployees. Under most collective bargaining agreements, disputes over whether good
cause existed for a discharge are determined by an arbitrator. The arbitrator normally
will have the experience and expertise necessary to unravel the issues presented by
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workers that a jury should be allowed to find that a personnel manual constitutes an
explicit statement of policy rather than an expression of company philosophy, subject to
appropriate business judgment. 211
The flawed rationale of Woolley and Toussaint is the justification that statements in
personnel manuals regarding continued employment promise a benefit of job security
that serves as an inducement for employees to work for the employer. 212 By this reason-
ing, these courts and others recognize that employees might in fact rely upon these
policy provisions.213 These courts readily acknowledge, however, that the dismissed em-
ployee need not show reliance on the policies. 214 This reasoning is erroneous because
only if the employee actually relies upon the job security provision can it reasonably
serve as an inducement to employment. 215 Where the employee is totally unaware of the
existence of the employee manual or its provisions specifically relating to job security,
the employer receives no gain in employee morale or productivity. 216 The employer
compensates the employee for services performed within the normal course of employ-
ment, and this compensation is consideration for work performed. 217 Under these cir-
cumstances, the job security provision becomes merely gratuitous.
One of the judicial objectives in implied-in-fact contract analysis is to discover the
mutual intentions and expectations of the parties and to enforce them.21 8
 But the Woolley
court and others require that these mutual intentions be implicit under the circumstances
rather than actual. Rather than searching for mutual intent of the parties to enter into
long-range commitments, the Toussaint and Woolley courts relied on the intent presumed
from unilateral actions of the employer and the intentions of the employee which may
first become apparent after the employer has dismissed the employee. Employers may,
such disputes. A civil suit by a private employee for breach of contract, however,
carries with it the right to a jury trial. In Toussaint, the court recognized that the
legitimacy of the employee's expectations regarding promises of continued employ-
ment were for the jury to determine. Because the jury probably will lack an arbitrator's
expertise in this field, and because it probably will be more sympathetic to the claims
of the employee than an arbitrator, juries may render verdicts which accord non-
unionized employees greater protection than unionized employees have achieved.
Murg & Scharman, supra note 48, at 369-70 (citations omitted).
2" See Woolley, 99 N.J. at '298, 491 A.2d at 1264-65.
212 See Murg & Scharman, supra note 48, at 370. In ruling that the provisions of employment
manuals could be contractually binding, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Woolley stated that
"[o]ur courts will not allow an employer to offer attractive inducements and benefits to the workforce
and then withdraw them when it chooses, no matter how sincere its belief that they are not
enforceable." Woolley, 99 N.J. at 300, 491 A.2d at 1266. In Toussaint, the Michigan Supreme Court
reasoned that "itlhe employer secures an orderly, cooperative and loyal work force, and the
employee the peace of mind associated with job security ." Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 614, 292
N.W.2d at 892.
215 See, e.g., Woolley, 99 N.J. at 300, 491 A.2d at 1266; Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 614, 292 N.W.2d
at 892.
214 See Woolley, 99 N.J. at 304 n.10, 491 A.2d at 1268 n.10; Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 613 n.25,
292 N.W,2d at 892 n.25.
212
 For a discussion of reliance as consideration for a promise of job security, see generally Note,
Implied Contract Rights, supra note 44, at 354-56.
218
 Where the employee becomes aware of the employment manual provisions after accepting
employment, this new information may or may not affect morale or productivity.
217 See Murg & Scharman, supra note 48, at 337-38.
218 See, e.g., Drzewiecki v. 1-18cR Block, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 695, 703-04, 101 Cal. Rptr. 169,
174 (1972); Toussaint, 408 Mich. 579, 600, 292 N.W.2d 880, 885 (1980).
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on the other hand, reasonably expect in the normal course of business that the traditional
employment-at-will doctrine will preclude the enforceability of a wide range of employee
manual statements, and they then will issue personnel documents to provide guidance
to both management and employees alike. 219 The intent of the employer may, therefore,
differ from that of the dismissed employee. This being so, the employer may become
saddled with a fixed labor force when demand shifts resulting from changes in the
political, economic and technological environment warrant labor reductions.22 °
Because the implied contract exception may allow an employer to discharge an at-
will employee only for good cause and thus not to meet changing business demands, the
need for judicial determination of what constitutes good cause ultimately places the
courts in the position of making business decisions in lieu of the employer. 221 When the
ultimate decision whether the employer had good cause for discharge falls in the hands
of a jury, there arises a risk that the jury will impose its subjective judgment as a substitute
for that of the employer, and the employer may find itself liable for wrongful discharge
even though the dismissal was in good faith. 222
As the courts become more involved in defining good cause and in protecting the
job security of employees, they are likely to find good cause provisions where none
previously existed. 223 The courts will look beyond express statements of company policy
contained in personnel handbooks in order to infer a policy of continued employment
without a showing of good cause for discharge. When courts have looked beyond
personnel documents to provide job security, some have indicated their willingness to
find binding good cause requirements from, for example, the employer's "custom,
practice, or policy"224 or from business usage, the nature of employment, and circum-
219 In Toussaint, one amicus curiae argued on behalf of the employer that
large organizations regularly distribute memoranda, bulletins and manuals reflecting
established conditions and periodic changes in policy. These documents are drafted
"for clarity and accuracy and to properly advise those subject to the policy memo of
its content." If such memoranda are held by this Court to form part of the employment
contract, large employers will be severely hampered by the resultant inability to issue
policy statements.
Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 619, 292 N.W.2d at 894.
22° Murg & Scharman, supra note 98, at 336.
221 See, e.g., Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 622, 292 N.W.2d at 896.
222 See id. The Toussaint court expressed its concern that:
[wihere an employee is discharged for stated reasons which he contends are not 'good
cause' for discharge, the role of the jury is more difficult to resolve. If the jury is
permitted to decide whether there was good cause for discharge, there is the danger
that it will substitute its judgment for the employer's. If the jurors could not have
fired the employee for doing what he admittedly did, or they find he did, the employer
may be held liable in damages although the employee was discharged in good faith
and the employer's decision was not unreasonable.
Id. Nevertheless, the court held that the good cause provision provides more than a promise to act
in good faith. Id.
223 See, e.g., Tiranno v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 99 A.D.2d 675, 472 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1984). The
Tiranno court held that an employer's statement that employees would be terminated if their
performance did not measure up to company standards was effectively a good cause standard, and
therefore it remained for the jury to find if good cause for termination existed. Id. at 675, 472
N.Y.S.2d at 50.
224 See, e.g., Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 902-03 (3rd Cir. 1983).
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stances surrounding the employment. 225 As one commentator suggests, where the du-
ration of an employment relationship is unexpressed and cannot be determined from
the terms of the agreement, the court may rely upon the "common law of the job" to
discover the expectations of the parties and conclude that an employee either does or
does not have job security. 228
Judicial acknowledgment of the employer's right to limit the effect of this exception
by disclaimer provisions stating that the employment is terminable at will227 may be of
little practical significance or protection to the employer. For example, subsequent to the
Toussaint decision, which explicitly acknowledged that an employer's use of a disclaimer
could avoid liability, a Michigan court of appeals ruled that when a policy manual contains
both assurances of job security and a disclaimer, it remains a question for the jury as to
which governs. 225 Decisions like this inject even greater uncertainty into the scope of the
implied-in-fact contract exception, and make it more difficult for employers to issue
policy statements without running the risk of incurring wrongful discharge liability.
In addition, extension of the protection of the implied-in-fact contract exception to
greater numbers of employees without requiring a showing of reliance upon or even
awareness of the job security provisions could prove to be a disincentive to employers to
produce manuals otherwise helpful to employees, and could serve to limit job security
in contrast to the exception's intended effect. For example, the threat of wrongful
discharge litigation will motivate employers to scrutinize all personnel documents and
memoranda in an effort to limit wrongful discharge liability. 229 In so doing, employers
will be compelled to choose between two conceptual approaches in response to wide-
spread adoption of the implied-in-fact contract exception. The "hard-line" approach is
to avoid strictly the creation of any job security rights through policy statements; this
approach would involve explicitly informing employees by way of express disclaimers
not to expect any such rights. 250 Employers would therefore remove any and all language
that might be construed as providing any degree of security in employment." The
other, more supportive approach, would lead employers to freely confer the right of
continued employment."'
Both of these approaches are preventive measures against wrongful discharge liti-
gation, but it is unlikely that employers will choose one approach over another solely
because the approach better protects against liability. 2" Rather, traditional business con-
siderations will remain the determinative factors, and employers will continue to conduct
225 See, e.g„ Shah v. American Synthetic Rubber Corp., 655 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Ky. 1983); Parker
v. United Airlines, Inc., 32 Wash. App. 722, 725, 649 P.2d 181, 183 (1982).
2" Note, Implied Contract Rights, supra note 44, at 356.
227 See, e.g., Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 612, 292 N.W.2d at 891; Woolley, 99 N.J. at 309, 491 A,2d
at 1271. See also Crain v. Burroughs Corp., 560 F. Supp. 849, 852 (C.D. Cal. 1983). The reasoning
here is that the disclaimer becomes part of the employment contract upon distribution as would a
provision regarding job security. In the view of one court, if statements in manuals favorable to
employees can bind an employer, it should be able to obtain protection from liability by a disclaimer
in the manual. See Batchelor v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 114 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3467 (E,D. Mich. 1983).
225 Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 302 N.W.2d 307, 310-11 (Mich. App. 1981).
229 See Lopatka, supra note 20, at 27-29.
2]0 See id. at 27.
2" See Lopatka, supra note 20, at 27-29.
"2 Id.
235 Id.
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their business affairs so as to attract the best employees, avoid unionization, and earn a
profit.234 In this regard, employers will likely grant some degree of job security in order
to maintain a productive work environment. 235 But lifetime employment that potentially
would result from expansive job security provisions generally would be undesirable to
most employers. Therefore, employers will need to achieve an acceptable balance be-
tween the hard-line and the supportive approaches. 2" The risk of wrongful discharge
liability will compel employers to rely upon cost-benefit analyses to achieve that balance;
they will need to weigh their potential liability, the costs of expanded job security, and
the value to the business of manuals and handbooks: 237 It is likely that the results of
such analyses, and subsequent excision of policy manual provisions, would not lead to
the protection of job security that judicial adoption of the implied contract exception
seeks to achieve.
In sum, the implied-in-fact contract exception gives a great deal of protection to the
discharged employee at the expense of the employer's flexibility to make personnel
decisions. Widespread acceptance of the implied contract theory of recovery will dras-
tically reduce the scope of the traditional employment-at-will doctrine. Alternatives are
available, however, that would more equitably balance the interests of the employer and
employee.
One alternative to the adoption of the implied-in-fact contract exception is the
expansion of the application of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 2"
When an employee brings a wrongful discharge action to enforce an employer's promise,
that employee in effect is seeking to require the employer to conduct affairs in good
faith.239 For example, a court could find the termination of an employee who relied on
an employer's assurances of job security to be a breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. While this approach still involves judicial determination of what
constitutes good cause for termination, the covenant of good faith theory more faithfully
considers the interests of the employer and employee and protects the employer from
wrongful discharge liability when it terminates the employee in good faith.
Legislative modification of the employment-at-will rule is a second alternative to the
implied-in-fact contract exception. 24° Legislation to reform application of the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine should have two goals: uniformity in the resolution of employment
disputes; 24 ' and a fair balance between the interests of the employee in job security and





2" For a discussion of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, see supra notes 98-111 and
accompanying text.
239 The Supreme Court of Montana followed this approach in its 1982 decision in Gates v. Life
of Montana Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063 (Mont. 1982). The Gates court held that employee handbook
provisions had not been bargained for, but rather constituted a unilateral statement of company
policies, and therefore did not become part of the employment contract. Id. at 1066. The court
further held that the employment contract implied a covenant of good faith and fair dealing and
that it remained a question for the jury to consider whether the manner in which the employer
carried out the employee's termination constituted a breach of the implied covenant. Id. at 1067.
246 See Peirce, supra note 23, at 45.
241 Id.
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the business effectively and efficiently. 2'12
 The legislation should define "good cause" as
it relates to employment termination decisions and establish standards for allocating the
burden of proof. 243
 It also should establish standards for employers to follow in pro-
mulgating internal policy documentation, including the prerogative to incorporate in a
prominent place a disclaimer proclaiming that employment is at-will. 2"
The advantages of legislative modification of the employment-at-will rule are many.
First, the employee and employer will benefit from the availability of a statutory remedy
that clearly identifies the burden of proof required and thus reduces the inherent
variability in jury determinations of what constitutes good cause. 246 Second, the employer
will benefit from greater certainty in making employment decisions and issuing policy
statements and thus will be able to produce personnel manuals and handbooks but with
greater ability to limit liability from wrongful discharge litigation. 246
 Finally, the employ-
ment relationship will benefit from a better understanding of the obligations of the
parties."'
These alternatives to the implied-in-fact contract exception will provide employees
with a considerable amount of protection in the face of discharge from employment
based on improper motives. At the same time, these alternatives will preserve the em-
ployer's discretion to make personnel decisions, constrained only by identifiable stan-
dards of conduct.
V. CONCLUSION
The public policy and good faith common law exceptions as well as the implied-in-
fact contract exception have greatly eroded the employment-at-will doctrine. Courts
developed each theory because of the concern that an employer's zealous pursuit of
business objectives would unfairly or unlawfully trample the rights and interests of
employees. The implied-in-fact contract exception, in which courts infer assurances of
job security from employment manuals and personnel documents, has caused extensive
erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine because it can be applied so as to limit the
employer's freedom to terminate employment except upon a showing of good cause.
242 Courts faced with the application of the employment-at-will doctrine to employment disputes
consider this a primary objective. See, e.g., Monge, 114 N.H. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551 ("[T]he
employer's interest in running his business as he sees fit must be balanced against the interest of
the employee in maintaining his employment ...."); Pierce, 84 N.J. at 71, 417 A.2d at 511 ("In
recognizing a cause of action to provide a remedy for employees who are wrongfully discharged,
we must balance the interests of the employee, the employer, and the public").
243
 Peirce, supra note 23, at 45-46. Professor Peirce proposes a statutory limitation on the
employer's right to terminate after an initial probationary period absent statutorily defined good
cause. Id. This approach, it seems, is unduly burdensome on the employer, but nevertheless the
resulting greater certainty would be preferable to the uncertainty of the judicial application of the
employment-at-will doctrine,
244 Legislation in this area would go far towards satisfying the concerns of, for example, one
amicus curiae in Toussaint, who argued that organizations who regularly distribute internal memo-
randa and manuals "will be severely hampered by the ... inability to issue policy statements" if
courts hold that these memoranda and manuals form part of the employment contract. Toussaint,
408 Mich. at 619, 292 N.W.2d at 894.
245 See supra notes 221-26 and accompanying text.
242 See supra note 244.
417 Peirce, supra note 23, at 47.
356	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 28:327
The implied-in-fact contract exception extends job security protections to large
numbers of employees who may not have placed reliance on employment manual pro-
visions and who are fully compensated for services performed, and this will unfairly
burden employers. If the exception becomes widely adopted, employers' reliance on
what remains of the traditional employment-at-will doctrine in the conduct of business
affairs may subject them to wrongful discharge liability. As an alternative, courts should
limit recovery by discharged employees to situations in which the employer has acted in
bad faith. Further, legislative rather than judicial modification of the employment-at-will
rule can lead to a greater amount of certainty in employment relations and thereby
protect the interests of both employers and employees.
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